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This paper explores the local experience of a particular practice of memory, the public performance of truth-telling within the context of a Truth Commission (TC). There are many theories in the literature about how truth-telling works within a TC. There are those who focus on the process of acknowledgement, or the “affirmation of atrocity” (Minow, 1998: 4), which is thought to be a form of justice for those long denied recognition (Asmal, 1992: 501; Roht-Arriaza, 2006: 2; van Zyl, 2005: 211), and others who focus on the psychosocial processes of apology and forgiveness thought to initiate reconciliation (Fisher, 2001; Nadler and Schnabel, 2008). Still others believe that the benefit of truth-telling lies in the creation of a “collective memory” (Chapman & Ball, 2001: 15; Sooka, 2006: 319) that is shared by the whole population and provides a means to minimize “the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse” (Ignatieff, 1996: 113). Unfortunately, although there is little empirical evidence to support these claims (Brahm, 2007), scholars have heaped a great number of supposedly beneficent effects upon the process of truth-telling (Mendeloff, 2004). 
	It was in direct response to such claims that I spent ten months in Sierra Leone, between August of 2008 and July of 2009 evaluating the local effects of one such commission; the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) for Sierra Leone. My goal in this research was to respond directly to critiques such as those expressed by Mendeloff (2004) and Brahm (2007), who argued that there is little evidence that truth-telling is either good or bad, and to test the interpretations of anthropologist such as Shaw (2005) and Kelsall (2005), who considered the TRC in Sierra Leone specifically to be disconnected and dissociated from local culture. What I found, through extended fieldwork, participant observation, and a series of semi-structured interviews with local people in and around the northern town of Makeni, was that the TRC was indeed of questionable benefit to local people. What I found was that many had experienced the TRC not as helpful, but as a provocation. 
	Hanna, for example, a 29 year old housewife in Makeni, poignantly described the TRC as coming “to add pepper in my wound,” and a local man who often ate lunch on the steps of the non-governmental organization (NGO) with which I volunteered for three months described the truth-telling process as “pouring hot water over your head.” A journalist friend of mine told the story of an old Pa who had both hands chopped off during the war and who had chosen not to attend the hearings because they were of no use to him – as you hear so often in Sierra Leone he was coping; he had managed to press on after the war, to rebuild his life, to send his children to school, to forget small-small – but when he heard on the radio the voice of the man who chopped his hands it all returned to him. In that moment, explained my friend, the memories of the war came back to the old Pa, hot and painful. The old Pa recalled how that man had hurt him, maimed him, and he hated that man anew.  
	While a number of authors have already shown that the truth-telling processes of the TRC were inappropriate within the culture of Sierra Leone (Shaw, 2005; Kelsall, 2005; Millar, 2011b), this paper explores why this was so through the perspective of performativity theory; which provides more generalizable lessons for reconciliation theory in diverse settings. It argues that performances of self within society lead both to the internalization of that self within the performer, and also the expectation of socially and culturally appropriate reciprocal performances from other actors within society. I illustrate how the ritualized performances of traumatic memory demanded by the TRC for Sierra Leone instantiated, in the performer and audience members who identified with the performance, the role of the victimized. Individuals who performed that role or audience members who psychologically identified with that role internalized culturally specific expectations; they expected culturally appropriate and commensurate reciprocal performances of patronage and assistance. However, performative memory at the TRC only generated one of the necessary roles; nobody was required to perform – and thereby internalize – the role of patron or provider. When the reciprocal performances were not forthcoming, the socially generative nature of performance became unpredictable; instead of experiences of healing, reconciliation or justice, truth-telling generated experiences of frustration, anger, and resentment. As I heard regularly from local people around Makeni, the TRC provided “no good thing.” In sensitive transitional settings, like postwar Sierra Leone, this unpredictability can potentially be destabilizing and, therefore, endanger prospects for a peaceful transition. 
In the rest of this paper I will first provide a brief overview of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the process followed by the TRC in conducting its public hearings in the post-conflict period. I will then describe the transitional justice and reconciliation theory that purports to explain how truth-telling leads to psychological healing and intergroup reconciliation, before describing, very briefly, the actual local experiences of the TRC on the ground in Makeni. I then turn to performativity theory and the internalization of social selves through social performance. I focus not on performers as isolated agents, but as performing both within and on their social context which can confirm or deny their performance and describe how social counterparts play a pivotal role in acknowledging or affirming the social self being performed. In the final section I will describe how, in Makeni, the absence of reciprocal performances of patronage led to a socially generative performance of memory, but one that was unpredictably generative and, for many, provocative.  The paper will conclude with recommendations for future truth commissions and for future research into their effects. I will argue that conceiving of ritual performances of memory as performative can help scholars and practitioners to plan, administer and evaluate socially generative processes of reconciliation and transitional justice. 

War and reconciliation in Sierra Leone
The Sierra Leonean conflict began in early 1991 when a small force of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) fighters infiltrated over the border from neighboring Liberia. Although initially quite small in number, local disaffection with years of elite corruption and a general dissatisfaction with the state of government allowed this small band to quickly grow and develop into a significant fighting force and a threat to the state (Shearer, 1997: 849). Within just a single year the All People’s Congress (APC) government, which had ruled the one party state for a full 24 years (Shaw, 2002: 249), had been unseated in a coup prompted by the unrest and increasing violence. However, as the RUF then refused to lay down their arms and enter peaceful politics the war degraded into a series of coups and failed governments. Some 50,000 people were eventually killed in the ensuing violence (Bellows & Miguel, 2006: 394) and 1.7 million were displaced, either internally or overseas (Amowitz et. al., 2002: 214).
	Over the course of the 11 year civil war “Sierra Leoneans experienced displacement, looting, burning, rape, torture, amputation and the killing and abduction of family members” (Shaw, 2007: 185), and there was widespread violent abduction and indoctrination of child soldiers by the RUF (Fanthorpe, 2001: 364). Such atrocities were, however, not committed only by the rebels. The term ‘sobel’ was used to describe those who were “soldier by day and rebel by night” (Dougherty, 2004: 315), using whichever cover was best suited to acquiring the spoils of war through violence and pillage. In addition, and highlighting the predatory nature of much of this violence, it was rural women who experienced the brunt of atrocities during the war, not members of the various fighting forces (Zack-Williams, 1999: 156). Although the violence was not sustained everywhere throughout the war, it was targeted often at non-combatants and has resulted in innumerable postwar hardships.
	It was within this postwar environment that the TRC attempted to implement its specific form of reconciliation; the collection of victim, witness and perpetrator stories in one-on-one statement taking sessions and the presentation of a select number of these stories in front of live audiences in town halls and community centers throughout the country and over the radio. These hearings, carried out between the 14th of April and the 5th of August 2003, were a major component of the TRC’s work and included a “series of thematic, institutional and event-specific hearings in Freetown” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004: 181) and 4 days of public hearings and one day of closed hearings in each of the 12 district headquarter towns throughout the country. As has been the case in most TCs since the famous South African case (Freeman 2006: 26), these public hearings were supposed to “cater to the needs of the victims” and promote “social harmony and reconciliation” (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004: 231). 
	
Truth-telling in theories of justice, reconciliation and healing
The plan for the public hearings in Sierra Leone was consistent with a vast body of literature that describes the positive effects of truth-telling in transitional or postwar states. Many theorists have seen truth-telling itself as a form of justice, arguing that allowing perpetrators to hide the events of the past from victims and survivors is itself another violation and that knowing the truth will thus provide some measure of justice (Popkin & Bhuta, 1999; Minow, 1998). There is in fact a significant push to have the “right to truth” recognized in international law (Antkowiak, 2002; Naqvi, 2006). Such arguments claim explicitly that failing to remember or acknowledge past atrocities is itself an injustice, so truth-telling is itself the provision of justice. 
Others argue that truth-telling will break down barriers between the parties to the conflict, will act not to provide justice, but to provide reconciliation between the formerly warring parties. To such scholars conflict is seen to create an in-group and an out-group (Volkan, 1997; Bar-Tal & Bennink, 2004; Fisher, 2001), and the process of truth-telling is like a collective storytelling therapy which breaks down such divides between identity groups, creating a new national narrative and “collective memory” (Chapman & Ball, 2001: 15; Sooka, 2006: 319). This new collective memory of the past, being shared by the whole population, provides a means to minimize “the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse” (Ignatieff, 1996: 113), and promotes peaceful coexistence.
	For many authors truth, and by extension, truth-telling, is the pivotal moment of reconciliation between two sides in the transitional or postwar situation. Just as recognition of a wrong is the first step to putting it right, admitting one is an alcoholic is the first step towards getting help, or overcoming denial is the first step towards healing after the death of a loved one, so truth is seen by many as the first step towards reconciliation and healing. Desmond Tutu, the chairman of the South African TRC, for example, had a “tendency to understand the task of the TRC in terms of the metaphor of ‘healing the body’ of the nation” (Allan, 1999: 46), and the first task was to cut it open and explore what was wrong; investigate the disease so it could be correctly healed. Similarly, Fisher describes the performance of reconciliation as comprising four stages: “acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness, and assurance” (2001: 37), where acknowledgement can largely be seen as the recognition of experiences of conflict as true, and both Lederach (1999) and Kriesberg (1999) have developed models of reconciliation that similarly rely on the initial exploration of ‘the truth.’
	But a distinction must be made between finding the truth, and performing the truth; or between truth-seeking, and truth-telling. Early TCs, prior to the South African case, did not generally include public performances of memory, but were reliant more on the investigation of police and military records and private interviews with victims, survivors, witnesses, and perpetrators. These early TCs were not broadcast to an audience by television or radio, but were typed up, collated into a report, and submitted to government. In a direct shift away from this model the South African TRC turned the public performance of personal memory into media images that could “be conveyed to the country as a whole” (van der Merwe, 2001: 189), and which Krabill described as providing a “moment of common experience that transcend[ed] the daily divergence of lives” (2001: 570). In Nadler and Shnabel’s theory of socioemotional reconciliation, such truth-telling performances are considered “revolutionary” in that they are thought to inspire immediate social change between the two sides of the conflict (2008).
	In short, many theorists of transitional justice, conflict resolution, and reconciliation have accepted the idea that victims and survivors of violence have an “instinctive need to tell their stories” (Allan and Allan, 2000: 462), and further still, to do so in public. Within this process we see the expansion in theory of individual processes of healing to the national level. The “individual and political realms mov[e] inevitably closer” and individual reconciliation and forgiveness are considered to have collective or national affects (Hamber, 2007: 118). Or, as Prager has argued “[t]o heal the nation requires the curing of the self” (2008: 406). Public truth-telling – performances of memory – are, therefore, theorized to be predictably socially generative; they are thought to produce experiences of justice, psychological healing, and intergroup reconciliation.
However, in direct contradiction to these theories local audiences in Sierra Leone had a distinctly negative experience of the process (Shaw, 2005; Millar, 2010, 2011a, 2011b). Truth-Telling in this case was provocative, not healing. Echoing the words of Hannah presented above, Saidu, the 61 year old headmaster of a primary school, felt that the TRC was “trying to create some problems” because “when I forgive somebody, even if I remember it in my mind, you don’t say it out loud,” and Alpha, a 32 year old farmer, believed the process to be “only provocation to those that they seized advantage on during the war.” 
Similarly, Boubakar, a 48 year old teacher, argued that the TRC “was just talk that they came and talked. What they talk, they didn’t even do it. So I do not feel that they even came to help Salone,” and Yamboi, a 30 year old salesman, believed that “what they said they would do for people, they were not able to do those things. So I feel that they are not able to make it successful.” Brima, a 25 year old farmer, felt that the TRC “will not just come and talk, talk, talk, talk, and I will forget about it,” and Adama, a 39 year old trader, argued quite cogently that “when you see that person who has killed your relative or friend, when you see him, your heart will still run back.”
	Clearly Adama’s opinion reflects the experience described above in the story of the old Pa; a victim hearing again the story of their own victimhood and returning to the emotional state of that moment, perhaps years ago, when they had been tortured, amputated, raped, or forced to witness atrocities committed on others. As she says, “your heart will still run back.” But why is it that Sierra Leoneans had this experience of the truth-telling performances of the TRC, as opposed to the psychological healing, intergroup reconciliation, and justice predicted by so many truth-telling advocates? 
A number of authors have previously noted the cultural miss-fit between the truth-telling process and locally accepted memory practice in Sierra Leone (Shaw, 2005; 2007; Kelsall, 2005; Millar, 2011b, 2012a), and Millar has highlighted the lack of ‘otherizing’ during and after the war and the resulting lack of a need for intergroup reconciliation (2012b). However, this paper explores specifically the socially generative nature of public performances of traumatic memory, specifically through the lens of performativity theory and with a focus on the re-victimization or re-traumatization of those performing truth, as well as audience members who identify with those performed memories. I argue here not only that the TRC intervened in a context for which it was unnecessary, but that the central process of the project theorized to be the pivotal beneficial event providing positive social experiences to the local people – the truth-telling performances –actually initiated an unstable social situation. Before moving to this, however, I first provide a brief review of performativity theory.

Performance theory and social generation 
In this section I am concerned with explaining three aspects of social performance theory; first, how social performance is generative of selves; second, how social performance is generative of social reality; and third, how resulting cultural norms demand appropriate reciprocal performance from other’s in the social environment to complete performance and generate predictable social outcomes. I will present, in brief, the theories and arguments of a number of key thinkers to illustrate the central tenets of performativity for international relations, conflict resolution, transitional justice, or memory studies scholars who may be unfamiliar with those theories, before turning in the next section to the potential implications of this theory for TCs when considered as performative ritual events. First, I describe how performance is theorized to be generative of individual selves. Two authors whose work is central to this claim are Erving Goffman and Judith Butler, both of whom described the recursive manner in which individuals present their selves to the social world, and in which this presentation is then generative of individual selves. 

Performativity and the self	
In his classic The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959) Goffman described how an individual's performance of small tasks in everyday settings – around the house or in conversation with others – projects an image of that individual to society. In a simple sense such presentations project the image of the performer to society, and thus tell society who that person is. However, the more significant claim is that such “projection commits him to what he is proposing to be” (1959: 10). In other words, performances of self are strategic, they project what the performer wants to be seen to be in society, but they are also limiting, in that they then commit the performer to that role; the self we project becomes the self we must project. 
	Similarly, Judith Butler argues, in her theory of gender performativity, that social performance continually reifies gender norms in society. She argues that “gender is always a doing.” It is in the very acts performed that we locate an individual’s gendered self. She says that “gender proves to be performative – that is, constituting the identity it is purported to be” (2006: 34). For Butler “acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an interior and organized gender core” (2006: 186), but only an illusion. Gender, she argues, does not exist prior to the performance in the individual performer. It is only through the performance that gender is realized. The gendered subject cannot be considered to “preexist the deed” (2006: 34). For Butler, therefore, “identity is performatively constituted by the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results” (2006: 34).
	In this way both Goffman and Butler inform us of the power of performance to create identities. However, such performances are not generated in a vacuum. They both occur within and act upon society. First the performer appropriates appropriate modes of performance from society. Society is the structure from which agency is extracted. Goffman notes, for example, that performances are driven by “standards we unthinkingly apply” (1959: 55), standards that must come from somewhere. It is only by seeing these standards somewhere else, by identifying norms of behavior and practice out in the world that surrounds the performer, that such performances can be shaped. Goffman argues that social models allow a “mask of manner [to] be held in place from within” only when they are accepted by the performer (1959: 57). He claims, therefore, that performances must be seen as both generative of a self performed and themselves generated by external social standards internalized and incorporated by the actor and reproduced in performance. 
	Similarly, Butler does not claim that gender is performed by individuals free of external influence; individual bodies creating their own unique performance of gender. Instead she describes performances as individual “styles of the flesh” (2006: 190) or inscriptions “on the body” (2006: 184). She states that “these styles are never fully self styled, for styles have a history, and those histories condition and limit the possibilities” (2006: 190). In this way, individuals cannot be seen as inscribing their own bodies with styles – norms of gender performance – but as being inscribed upon by the social world. Again, society structures the individual performances that are generated. Gender norms are created in society, seen by the performer, reproduced in performance, and then instantiated in the individual self in the performative act. Both authors, therefore, recognize that performances, as much as being performed, are also pre-formed, socially delimited and internalized within the performer through interaction with society that confirms and reaffirms the validity and appropriateness of their performance.  
	This is a critical point for my argument in this paper; the self is itself inscribed with models and norms of social origin. As such, each individual’s self concept is generated through socially prescribed performance. In performance “a soul inhabits him and brings him to existence” (Foucault, 1995: 30); that is, the performance informs the self. But, as individuals become convinced of their own performances they are internalizing the standards, politeness, and decorum of the society in which they perform (Goffman, 1959: 107). The performed self is confirmed by society’s reaction to it. In everyday interaction we are convinced of the validity of our performance by the subtle validations of our audience; the fact that my students perform the subtle rituals of respect (listening, taking notes, facing me in a lecture hall) reaffirm to me that I am correctly performing the role of lecturer).  
	
Performativity and society
But in performing our roles – those internalized and accepted norms of behavior – we act not only to generate our selves, but to affect society. Social acts are not only performative in the generation of selves, but in generating the social world. As described by Hannah Arendt, the idea of performative acts can be found in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, where the term energeia, or “actuality” refers to acts that “exhaust their full meaning in the performance itself,” where “the work is not what follows and extinguishes the process but is embedded in it; the performance is the work” (1958: 206). J.L. Austin took up this idea of the performative act and applied it to what he called “speech acts,” which he describes as “the doing of an action” through an utterance (1975: 5). In his own terms, “the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action” (1975: 6). 
	Austin describes examples of such performative speech acts with sentences such as “’I do’ (sc. Take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)”, or “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth.” Both of these sentences are themselves performative acts, in that, with their utterance the speaker has performed a social act (i.e., getting married or naming a ship) (1975: 5). Such performatives are generative of a new social situation and are, as such, socially generative acts. Goffman too clearly describes how entire social realities are generated and maintained by performance, not simply the reality of selves. As he eloquently describes, in this social generation, we all “carry within ourselves,” … “something of the sweet guilt of conspirators” (1959: 105).
However, just as individual performances of self are socially delimited, so socially generative performative acts must be relevant to and consonant with the social context. Describing this element of his theory led Austin to coin the term illocutionary act, referring to acts consisting of “utterances which have a certain (conventional) force” (1975: 109). These utterances have social effects in their own right, they are performative, but only in the correct context. Austin uses the example of a warning or an order (1975: 131) such as “be careful, there are sharks in the water.” Through this sentence the speaker is not convincing, or persuading the listener, or suggesting to the listener, he/she is actually performing the act of warning. However, the act is only completed and socially generative in a particular context (e.g. on a beach). It is completely meaningless in other contexts (e.g. in the middle of a shopping mall or at the top of a mountain).  By conventional, therefore, Austin means that the presentation must be contextually and culturally appropriate. 
In a similar vein Hornsby argues that there must be the “presence of reciprocity” for the success of a speech act, in that the audience must recognize the illocutionary effects of the speech act. This is only possible, he argues, within “certain socially defined conditions”, i.e., shared understandings. Such conditions are described by Hornsby (1994) as “the mind-sets and expectations of those with whom we speak” (1994: 198-199); i.e. the audience. Similarly, Jeffrey C. Alexander claims that performance succeeds or fails to be socially generative depending on the extent to which one can “convince others that one’s performance is true” (2004: 529-530). He argues that various elements of performance –signifiers, scripts, actors, audience, means of symbolic production, mise-en-scéne, and social power – must be consistent, or “fused” with each other, in order for performative success, or the generation of new social realities, to be achieved (2004: 529). Only when performances are fused will they achieve what he calls “cultural extension” and “psychological identification”, or the reciprocal exchange of meaning between the performer(s) and the audience (society) (2004: 531).
	All of these authors thus show that selves are internalized by individuals through the performances we project to the world, but that the norms and models of behavior we project are taken from and structured by a delimited set of performances we see in the social context within which we are located. In turn, the performances we enact have social effects; we perform within society but also on society and social change occurs as a result of performative action. Each of our actions are, together, generating our lived reality. However, acts will only be performative – will only have social affects – if the audience to such acts understands them and is able to respond accordingly; if those performances are, at least to some extent, commensurate with expectations and relevant within the norms and models accepted within the social reality of our audience. So, what does this mean in the context of the TRC’s public hearings and the performances of memory in Makeni? How does it help to explain the negative experiences of truth-telling in the TRC for Sierra Leone?

Performing victimization, expecting patronage
First, I would argue that the entire context of the TRC – its sensitization campaign on the radio, its statement taking process, the statements of the big men who ran the project at both the national and the local level, and, of course, the public hearings focusing on the performance of memory – communicated to large segments of the population that they were victims. The TC process has often, in fact, been promoted as a ‘victim-centered’ mechanism (Freeman, 2006: 24), designed to address the needs of victims, to respect victims, or to provide victims with healing and justice. The Sierra Leonean TRC too made such claims – it was coming to heal the entire nation which had, as a whole been traumatized by the war (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2004: 2) – and these claims were heard on the radio and interpreted by local people to mean that the TRC would provide help, resources, and assistance to those victimized by the past violence (Millar, 2010, 2011a).
	However, as many authors have noted, most transitional justice processes also place a great responsibility on the victim, and may result in additional harm. As Brounéus has described, many victims who told their stories at the Gacaca Courts in Rwanda experienced “[t]raumatization, ill-health, isolation, and insecurity” (2008: 72), while De Ycaza describes how, in the same case, victims were called on to play many roles in the “performance” of justice and to carry quite a bit of the procedural burden (2010: 14). Yael Danieli has argued that “every step throughout the justice experience” has the potential to lead towards “(re)victimizing and (re)traumatizing victims, or compounding their victimization” (2009: 355), while Prager notes that “[n]aratives of past wrongs tend to externalize conflict to the outside world” and “preserve others as villains and promote a sense of oneself as a victim” (2008: 411).
	This is no less true for the truth-telling model of reconciliation. Giri laments, in the case of the South African TRC, that the victim is asked to perform memory in public but that performance “is not accompanied by material reparation” (2011: 605), while Mendeloff notes that the empirical evidence is mixed regarding the cathartic vs. retraumatizing effects of truth-telling (2009). Fletcher and Weinstein highlight also the fact that truth-telling events, in this case war crimes trials, are used by groups to affirm their victimization (2002: 581). In the case of the TRC for Sierra Leone I would argue that this was indeed requested of the truth-tellers; that they identify themselves as victims and internalize that role. As mentioned above, it was the policy of the TRC specifically to affirm that the entire country had been victimized and Sierra Leone was, as a whole, a traumatized nation (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 2004: 2). As Prager argues, therefore, the purpose of all transitional justice processes has been the “reestablishment or creation of a historic link between all members of the polity” (2008: 406-407), and in Sierra Leone, the TRC attempted to create that link by defining everyone as similarly damaged by the war, similarly victimized. Unfortunately, if everyone plays the role of victim, nobody plays the role of savior.
In Sierra Leone this is of particular significance because of the social expectations of reciprocal exchange implicit within a patron-client system. Such systems are dominant throughout West Africa and, it has been argued, are rooted in the historic need to attract labor and to have “wealth-in-people” for survival on the frontier (Nyerges, 1992: 863). Such patron-client systems give rise to expectations of service to Big Men and reciprocation in the form of support, protection, and insurance for clients. Among the Gola, in the south of Sierra Leone along the border with Liberia, for example, “a big person (numu wa) is a powerful patron on whom others depend for political or economic assistance” (Leach, 1994: 60). Consumption by the big-man, is “balanced by generosity and other benevolent forms of extension to their dependents and supporters, big persons are understood as acting within moral limits” (Shaw, 2002: 256)  In this way, systems of patron-client relationships can be seen as reciprocal; there is “the implicit understanding that a chief will give his protection to those who submit to his authority and place themselves in his hands” (Jackson, 2004: 47). 
However, if and when the big men overdo their privileges and consume resources without providing for their clients, they are no longer operating within the socially normative processes of give and take. Shaw in fact argues that such big men risk being accused of the worst forms of cannibalistic bad medicine (1996: 37). In Sierra Leone today the role of the big man is occupied by politicians, representatives of international non-governmental organizations, businessmen, religious leaders, traditional chiefs, and leaders of the local secret societies. These big persons are responsible for the needs of their dependents, and their dependents rely on them for resources, support, and opportunities. Such patron-client relationships are the norm, they are the accepted practice (Millar, 2011b), and within this context clients ‘beg’ big men for resources and big men are responsible to provide.
To ‘beg’ is to supplicate oneself to those bigger than you; to request assistance from them. Begging, putting oneself in the service and in the debt of a Big Man, is an everyday norm in Sierra Leone and expected practice for meeting one’s daily needs. Finding a job, paying for school fees, dealing with medical emergencies, all such occasions lead clients to ‘beg’ to Big Men – their patrons, for resources and support. And, indeed, the public hearings of the TRC were no different. The vast majority of those who told their stories at the public hearings of the TRC, when asked at the end of their testimony if they had anything to say to or ask of the commission, asked for resources and support; for help from the commission. To local people harmed during the course of the war, who may have lost a house, a farm, a family member, or a way of life, the public hearing of the TRC was an opportunity to ‘beg’ to the assembled patrons, to request aid. The provision of this aid, the exchange of resources from the big men to the supplicant, would have represented the closing of the circle, the completion of the performative drama. 
Unfortunately, however, as noted above, while all of those performing the truth-telling performances were encouraged to play the role of the victim, nobody was encouraged to play the role of savior. As a result, there was a vacuum no actor was prepared to fill and those who so desperately needed help felt aggrieved or provoked by the process. As Prager has cogently noted “[t]he social world, when reconciliation or repair is the objective, is required to demonstrate its capacity to reconstitute social relationships” (2008: 416), but in Makeni these social relationships were not reconstituted because no party stepped forward to perform the required role. While all those who performed the role of victim, and those many hundreds in the audience or listening on the radio who identified with that role, internalized the socially and culturally delimited role of the victimized – through the performative process of truth-telling – nobody internalized the role of patron. The very clear result, in the case of Sierra Leone, was an experience of the TRC as provocation.  The process was socially generative, only not predictably so. 

Conclusion
This paper has attempted to explain the failure of the TRC for Sierra Leone to provide experiences of justice, reconciliation, and psychological healing among local people in the rural north of the country by viewing the truth-telling process of the TRC as a performative act, instantiating in the individual performers a social role – that of victim – which, in Sierra Leone, demands a reciprocal performance of helper or savior. Unfortunately, the process of truth-telling failed to demand that anyone perform that reciprocal role and so the process was experienced by many as a provocation. While transitional justice, reconciliation, and peace studies scholars often seem to consider TCs to be predictably socially generative of positive outcomes – both individual and collective – this article has highlighted the fact that these processes can be, and probably often are, unpredictably generative. They do not do what we think they do.
	In social performance theory there often appears to be only two ends to the performance spectrum, either social performance is successful – it produces the desired social affect – or it fails – there is no social affect. Alexander does introduce some nuance in the idea that performance can be more or less “fused” or more or less “de-fused,” but in his theory too successful social performances that are “convincing and effective,” or that are more 
“ritual-like” are those that are fused, while those that are more de-fused appear “artificial and contrived” (2004: 529), without socially generative affects. What I have shown however, for the case of the TRC for Sierra Leone, is that performances of memory should not be considered as either successfully or unsuccessfully socially generative, as either fused or de-fused, but should be considered potentially unpredictably socially generative; con-fused, if you will.
In the case of the TRC for Sierra Leone, the ritual performances of memory created individuals who saw themselves as victimized, as traumatized by war. The entire process of the TRC, the sensitization campaign informing the nation of its purpose, and the statements by the commissioner and the staff, informed those who had experienced some amount of trauma during the war that they were, in fact, victimized individuals. They accepted this new social role, modeled for them by the social context in which the TRC was administered.  Those who performed the role of victim, survivor, and witness, and those in the audience who identified with those roles, came to see themselves as the administrators of the process wanted them to see themselves, as victims in need of help. This was a successful social performance. 
The problem, of course, is that within the local context individuals in need of help and assistance expect reciprocal performances of assistance, as per the local norm of patron-client relationships. In Sierra Leone an individual in need of assistance goes waka, walking from patron to patron requesting some small-small thing and acquiring what they need. Indeed, many of my interviewees in and around Makeni who saw the public hearings of the TRC as a provocation voiced their frustrations with the lack of reciprocal assistance from big men in town. Those who had been primed to see themselves as victims were confused as to why the TRC itself did not perform the role of patron. As many of my interviews noted, the TRC provided “no good thing.”
Two key recommendations emerge from this argument; one pertaining to the planning and administration of TC processes, and another pertaining to their evaluation. First, it is clearly important for planners and administrators of TCs to understand the local cultural context and to take it seriously in their plans. In Sierra Leone, and in much of West Africa, the existing patron-client system primes the disempowered to turn to the empowered for help and resources. Therefore, within this social/cultural context the experience of a TC without any form of reparations should have been expected to be provocative. If the planners and funders of TCs are knowledgeable of the local culture, these errors will be less likely to occur, and, importantly, less likely to go unfixed over the course of the project once the problem is identified. 
Second, it is very important that administrators of TC processes conduct ongoing assessment of the impact of their processes. As noted above, the truth-telling processes of TCs are thought to be predictably socially generative, but even if they are not, ongoing assessment of impact could identify the break between theory and practice early in the administration of a project – if such ongoing evaluation was conducted. In Sierra Leone, although the TRC’s public hearings occurred over a course of four months it appears that no changes were made to the public hearings process. Even if some of the TRC staff and commissioners noticed the provocative or aggravating experience among some victims, witnesses and audience members changes were not made to the process to deal with these problems. 	Integrating evaluation staff and processes into the body of TCs could overcome such problems. 
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